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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates food scandals and the role of government in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the food 
industry and explores strategies for the Chinese government to tackle the food safety problems that abound in China.  
Based on the theoretical discussion of four types of CSR and the empirical evidence from four case studies, we argue 
that government influence on CSR in the food industry is determined by the intensity and salience of its own behavior 
and actions including regulations. We further believe that a balanced CSR strategy covering economic, legal, ethical 
and philanthropic considerations would work best for China. Our contributions include extending the CSR literature to 
the food industry and emerging economies like China and recognizing the distinctive role the government plays in the 
food industry. In addition, we provide a timely guide to establishing a food safety system in China. 
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1. Introduction 
Food safety is an issue that remains unresolved in both 
the developed and developing world. Barely having 
recovered from the shock of “mad cow disease” ema- 
nating from the UK in the 1990s, the 2008 “tainted 
milk” crisis in China serves as a reminder that the 
problem of food safety has not been contained or ade-
quately addressed. The World Health Organization [1] 
reports a rise of 30 percent in the number of people in 
developed countries who become ill from foodborne 
diseases each year. Smith and Riethmuller [2–4] pro- 
vide numerous other examples that show foodborne 
diseases do not discriminate between rich and poor 
countries with many cases having occurred in Indus- 
trialized economies: these range from Japan’s 1996 
radish sprouts food poisoning incident that resulted in 
10 deaths and 9,000 people being ill, to the “Arnotts 
Biscuits poisoning, the Australian peanut paste products 
affected by salmonella bacteria and the Jack in the Box 
contaminated beef incident in the USA”. So why is food 
safety still a problem, and a growing problem at that, in 
the world today? 
Apart from the food safety systems still being a “work 
in progress ” irrespective of which country one wishes to 
consider [5], Riethmuller and Morison [6] have identified 
at least three reasons for the growing importance 
of food safety issues. The first concerns changes in food 
consumption patterns. People are eating out more, re- 
sulting in greater consumer awareness of hygiene. Sec- 
ond, manufactured food products and prepared meals are 
available through supermarkets and other food outlets, so 
that the onus is on these food retailers to ensure hygiene 
standards are adhered to. Third, food safety has become a 
notable non-tariff barrier in international trade. There are 
numerous examples of developing nations accusing de- 
veloped ones of using food safety as a protectionist 
measure for domestic industry rather than for genuine 
safety concerns (see, for example, [7,8]).  
In view of these global developments the question of 
who is responsible for food safety arises. As consumers 
lack the scientific and infrastructural capacity to evaluate 
food risk, it is incumbent on the food industry to act with 
both integrity and within the legal guidelines, and for 
governments to provide those guidelines and enforce 
them for the consumer’s protection [9]. 
This article will survey how governments in the 
United States, the European Union and Australasia regu- 
late the food industry and influence the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) behavior of companies—and even 
the official world of governmental authorities at home 
and abroad-by examining the relevant characteristics of 
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their food safety systems. We argue that government 
influence on CSR in the food industry is determined by 
the intensity and salience of its own behavior and actions 
including regulations. The case studies have been se-
lected for the purposes of: a) providing exemplars of 
good and innovative international practice in prevention 
of food scandals and promoting good practices; and b) 
showing how national (USA), supranational-plus-interna- 
tional (EU), and bi-national (Australia and New Zealand) 
authorities handle food safety issues. This is of relevance 
to China in that it is a unitary state like the USA, but with 
a policy of strengthening regional cooperation in East 
and Central Asia (multilateral regionalism) as well as an 
internal system of provinces and autonomous regions 
whose collective population size more than doubles that 
of the EU. The PRC also functions as a “one country, 
two systems” entity with regard to the Special Adminis- 
trative Regions of Hong Kong, Macao and potentially 
Taiwan that are different to the provinces and autono- 
mous regions within China. The regulatory authority that 
covers Australia and New Zealand, Food Standards Aus- 
tralia New Zealand (FSANZ), provides a successfully 
functioning model for a regulatory function across two 
polities. While this “one system, two countries” is the 
reverse of China’s “one country, two systems” formula, 
it does show that as the PRC and its Special Administra- 
tive Regions continue to converge in terms of a capitalis- 
tic system but emphasize politico-social differences 
within the One China concept, a common regulatory me- 
chanism across various sectors could be an acceptable 
evolutionary move. 
The final section of the article profiles China’s 
“tainted milk” scandal and draws lessons from the theo- 
retical discussion and case studies for the Chinese gov- 
ernment and its food industry. The use of corporate so-
cial responsibility as a term applies in China to both pri-
vate and public sectors as these are often combined, ei-
ther from the transitional nature of China’s economy 
(from command to market) or from an emerging trend 
demonstrated by the EU—the Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). As Howcroft [10] notes: 
“Given the scale of the infrastructure and investment 
gap that the governments of Europe are facing and the 
constraints that they face in developing and financing 
their needs, an increased use of PPP approaches is inevi- 
table… [Governments] need to invest in the public sec-
tor’s understanding and capability to develop and procure 
such projects in ways which maximize the overall bene-
fits to the public sector and the public at large.”  
In China the boundaries between the state and business 
are neither clear nor necessarily inevitable. CSR must 
therefore take a broader view in its purview of applica- 
tion when addressing recommendations for China. Sec- 
tion 2 (What is CSR?), however, will take a theoretical 
perspective and focus on business enterprises in order to 
set the stage for conceptual applications for diverse set-
tings and actors (Section 3–Case Studies), from which 
lessons for China (Section 4) may be drawn. 
2. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility  
Corporate social responsibility varies in meaning and 
definitions depending on stakeholder perspectives, be 
they employees, consumers, unions, governments, local 
communities, shareholders, and executives. Unlike 
Friedman [11] who poses the conventional argument 
that an organization’s only responsibility was genera- 
ting profit, and that any activity that detracted from the 
goal of profit did not serve the shareholders’ best inter- 
ests, Carroll [12] goes beyond the economic limits of an 
organization’s responsibility to add legal, ethical and 
philanthropic dimensions. Societal rules in the form of 
laws and regulations had to be followed, but not simply 
at the minimum required level. Organizations should 
seek to realize higher standards, thereby fulfilling an 
ethical responsibility. Moreover, this ethical response- 
bility feeds into an organization’s philanthropic role of 
giving back to the community through donating part of 
its profits to the satisfaction of societal needs generally. 
Hence, CSR is an encompassing concept covering at 
least economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic consid- 
erations. We argue that a firm’s disposition towards 
CSR is best understood in terms of whether it fulfils 
these four types of CSR obligations. For this reason, we 
will use this encompassing definition of CSR through- 
out the article. 
Governmental influence on the CSR orientation of 
business firms is well recognized, and there is broad 
agreement that governments shape the attitude and be- 
havior of company CSR through legislative measures 
[13–15]. Recently, scholars have noted broader roles 
that governments have played in promoting CSR 
[15–19]. Crane and Matten [20] argue that the role of 
government has changed from traditional regulator of 
dependent firms to that of multi-faceted player in the 
face of increased corporate power. We have adopted 
Fox et al.’s [15] identification of four key roles for 
governments in promoting CSR: mandating, facilitating, 
partnering and endorsing. Each of these roles may be 
expected to vary in intensity and salience in relation to 
company CSR depending on the types of CSR under 
study. We believe this definition captures the compre- 
hensive nature of CSR in the food industry. The fore- 
most responsibility of companies engaged in the food 
industry is not economic profit in preference to all 
else—for if only profits were at stake then the cones- 
quences could be devastating, as China’s “tainted milk” 
scandal revealed—but the need to be legally responsible 
and obey laws. 
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Source: Adopted from Yang and Casali, 2009 
Figure 1. Government Influence on Four Types of CSR. 
 
We agree with Yang and Casali [21] that government 
influence on CSR is determined by the intensity and sa-
lience of its own behavior and actions and have adopted 
their two-by-two matrix as a framework to illustrate that 
the interaction between the government’s role and CSR is 
a function of (direct and indirect) government interven-
tion (see Figure 1). 
2.1 Government Influence and CSR 
Institutional theories suggest that states develop formal 
institutions in the form of laws and regulations to effect 
order, reduce uncertainty, and influence social actor be- 
havior in coordinating and promoting economic ex- 
change [22]. Specifically, rational choice institutionalists 
argue the behavior and actions of the government are 
important to the extent that formal and informal rules, 
with their associated monitoring and sanctioning mecha- 
nisms, result in either enabling or constraining social 
actors [23]. On the other hand, firms may take corrective 
actions in response or in anticipation of government in- 
tervention by choosing to: a) legitimize them, b) avoid 
legislation, and/or c) avoid negative publicity. Govern- 
ments, however, can deploy a preemptive strategy to cre-
ate an institutional environment capable of fostering a 
CSR outlook in business. 
2.2 Governmental Role with Four Types of CSR 
2.2.1 Government as Mandator (Legal CSR) 
Institutional theory holds that firms tend to comply with 
government legislation and regulation to legitimize their 
behavior in the marketplace [22]. Government can wield 
the power of formal institutions-such as legislation, the 
judicial system and regulatory agencies-to instill the atti-
tude and shape behavior of company CSR [24]. Govern-
ment as mandator influences company attitudes to CSR 
primarily through a carrot-and-stick strategy of: 1) pro-
viding tangible inducements for company resource allo-
cation toward stakeholders and behavior that is socially 
responsible; and 2) inflicting punishment through penal-
ties if actions are not taken, or standards are contravened 
[21].  
Government action in the form of legislation has been 
argued to be clearly influential in shaping company be- 
havior because it is mandatory [14]. This form of govern- 
ment intervention is direct and its degree can be decisive 
from the company perspective. Coercion of this nature 
tends to result in CSR policies being internalized to re- 
duce risks and search costs [25], as evidenced in a high 
profile US legislative framework-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002-which legislates financial reporting for publicly 
traded companies and their auditing firms [26]. A fine of 
US$5 million and a jail term of 20 years can be the pen- 
alty for CEOs and CFOs failing to certify statements or 
signing false statements [24].  
Support is also available for the efficacy of regulation 
on the emergence of socially responsible behavior with 
regard to the environment. Stone, Joseph, and Blodgett 
[27] find that the higher the degree of regulation the 
greater the likelihood of businesses adopting socially 
responsible behaviors. The efficacy of government’s role 
as Mandator is also seen in better compliance with the 
industry code of conduct [28]. It is argued that one of the 
motivating reasons for companies to follow codes of 
conduct appears to be a desire to avoid interference or 
legislation by government [29–31].  
2.2.2 Government as Facilitator (Economic CSR) 
Governments can play the role of facilitators to en- 
courage and influence corporations toward being econo- 
mically responsible. This can be done through govern- 
ment initiatives such as providing guidelines on content, 
fiscal and financial mechanisms, and creating framework 
conditions [13]. Notable actions toward facilitation 
include developing public policies for the training of 
skilled workers or establishing specialized government 
agencies to oversee these programs. The UK, for exam- 
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ple, implemented Industrial Training Boards and the 
Manpower Services Commission to encourage CSR in 
the areas of training and work experience opportunities. 
Moon [32] found that the Manpower Services Commi- 
ssion led to the Confederation of British Industry form- 
ing the Special Programs Unit to ensure large-scale train- 
ing programs for businesses occurred. 
Another mechanism for government as facilitator of 
economic CSR is provision of subsidies. Government 
subsidies allow firms to defray costs associated with 
employment and training schemes, thereby providing 
greater incentives to participate in new government 
employment programs [13]. Another example is the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry’s subsidy of research, 
publication and a website for BITC reports. In this way, 
government as facilitator produces the kind of influence 
that is salient and of direct relevance to the resource 
capacity of companies to implement economic CSR. 
It is common for governments worldwide to sponsor 
excellence in business awards as a mechanism to en- 
courage economic CSR [32]. Another device is the tax 
credit designed to bring private enterprise into poorer 
areas, as shown by the case of the UK 2002 community 
invest tax credit scheme (ibid.). Businesses are demons- 
trably more likely to participate in economic CSR pro- 
grams when the government is seen as Facilitator. For 
instance, one CSR business association, Business in the 
Community with its 700 members, accounts for 20% of 
private sector employment (ibid.). 
Also of interest is the finding that governments can 
exert influence on economic CSR by owning financial 
institutions, as in the case of the UK [33]. In most cases, 
government influence on economic CSR is direct, but 
with low intensity compared to the higher intensity 
strategy of government as mandator.  
2.2.3 Government as Partner (Philanthropic CSR) 
Most governments pursue a less regulatory approach in 
relation to philanthropic responsibility. Rather, they seek 
to reward good behavior, as shown in the taxation laws of 
many countries that allow taxpayers to entirely or par-
tially deduct philanthropic donations from their taxable 
income. For example, the Australian Income Tax As-
sessment Act of 1997 allows deductions for donations to 
recognized charities in order to encourage charitable be-
havior by enterprises. The Australian government bene-
fits through its willingness to partner with business 
through philanthropy as this strategy spreads the eco-
nomic burden of social responsibility across both the 
public and private sectors. Indeed, the popularity of this 
strategy can be seen through similar approaches taken by 
some EU countries [13]. According to a 2005 study con-
ducted by the Australian government in collaboration 
with other organizations, $3.3 billion were given by  
businesses in Australia between the 2003 and 2004 [34]. 
These businesses represented 67% of the total number of 
businesses in Australia (525,900) [34].  
Tax deductibility, significant as it is, is not the most 
important reason for philanthropic behavior in firms. 
Other positive influences encouraging philanthropic re- 
sponsibility have been found to embrace the following: a 
sense of reciprocation, respect for nonprofit organiza- 
tions, the desire to strengthen the community, and im- 
proving the world [34]. In recent years, a phenomenon 
called “strategic philanthropy” has emerged. Its expo- 
nential growth is indicative of its economic value: strate- 
gic philanthropy is viewed as a new and innovative way 
to achieve a competitive advantage. It involves a com- 
pany directly linking its core business-be it product or 
service-with charitable activity, for example, by donating 
one dollar for each purchase of the company’s product, or 
a percentage of the sales profit for a particular day [35]. 
In this way, a business can simultaneously fulfill its 
philanthropic responsibilities, promote its own product or 
service, and obtain a tax deduction. This provides a 
strong argument for the efficacy of government as part- 
ner when it comes to influencing philanthropic CSR in- 
directly, albeit very strongly [21]. 
2.2.4 Government as Endorser (Ethical CSR) 
As shown in the Figure 1, the government plays an En-
dorser role when it exercises its influence indirectly and 
at low intensity: in other words, when neither legal nor 
fiscal strategies can be used as influential means in ethi-
cal CSR.  
Yang and Casali [21]demonstrate that there is a cross 
linkage between ethics and law, and this nexus reflects 
the reality of laws issuing from a societal process that 
identifies and validates collectively the perceived mini- 
mum standards in a society, that then become the formal 
responsibility of government to protect. Arguably, be- 
haviors that have been converted into legislation and then 
executively reinforced contribute to the pool of societally 
agreed acceptable standards. These represent in a given 
era the minimum standards that are not negotiable and 
must be viewed as core principles [35,36]. The main 
purpose of the legislative process is to shift those princi-
ples from the very least influential government role (En-
dorser) to the areas where the government can have in-
tensive and direct influence as Mandator, in order to im-
pose those principles on firms in a powerful way. The 
law-ethics nexus thus represents a crucial space within 
which governments may manoeuvre to enhance the status 
and nature of CSR within society’s ontological base. 
Yet, government influence may lack power over all 
those actions that have not yet reached the grey area and 
that remain more a potentiality or “wish list” than an im-
perative or “must have list”. Examples of principles in 
the wish list are: proactive action in environment pro- 
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tection, workplace safety, customer interest, and respon- 
siveness to stakeholder concerns [21].  
An example in 2008 of government as endorser was 
provided by the Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, 
who asked the major Australian banks to pass on interest 
rate cuts to the consumer in full, emphasizing the fact that 
this would constitute a more ethical way to do business 
[37]. Despite political exhortation, there was no support-
ing legislation, or any tax benefits that would encourage 
the banks to behave in this way. The govern- ment was 
only endorsing a code of conduct that rested on a key 
principle: that the main purpose in cutting interest rates 
should be to reduce the burden of financial pressure on 
the consumer. It is not intended to increase bank pro- fits 
by reducing the price of resources (money)—that is, 
“profiteer at the expense of customers” (ibid.).  
The above suggests that government as endorser is in a 
weak position to influence CSR in terms of intensity and 
salience as compared to the other three types of CSR. It 
may be hypothesized that government as mandator is the 
strongest, with the other two-government as facilitator 
and government as partner occupying a second tier of 
intensity and salience. Government as endorser occupies 
the bottom tier. All, however, are valuable when de- 
ployed in concert so as to produce a balanced outcome: 
too much of one, such as government as mandator, might 
lead to the “nanny state” syndrome for instance; or an 
over-emphasis on low-intensity indirect influence could 
result in an ineffectual CSR effort.  
3. Case Studies: The US, the EU, Australia 
and New Zealand 
To understand how China’s food safety system may 
benefit from the theoretical-analytical discussion above, 
it is important to now turn to a number of empirical case 
studies in the developed world where international best 
practice may be expected to be found. The Chinese 
themselves have recognized that they lag behind in in- 
ternational norms and practices. At the Fifth China Food 
Safety Annual Meeting in 2007, China’s Vice Minister of 
Health Chen Xiaohong admitted that food safety in China 
did not match that of the developed world. Among the 
problems he identified were: pollution; low quality of 
some food products; inadequate technology, equipment, 
and quality testing systems; as well as weaknesses in 
food safety management [38].  
So what do the experiences of governments in indus- 
trialized nations reveal in relation to the hypothesized 
governmental role with the four types of CSR? What 
lessons do these findings have for China? The first is a 
brief case study from the United States where new com- 
prehensive methods are used. The second derives from 
the European Union whose legislative strengths are espe- 
cially pertinent to China’s own regulatory instincts, and 
the final investigation turns to Australia and New Zea- 
land. 
3.1 The United States: Comprehensive  
Strategies in a Unitary State 
The Food Protection Plan (FPP), released by the US Food 
and Drug Administration in November 2007, represents 
an especially exemplary and up-to-date model in its dual 
features. These are its provision of: a) an inte- grated 
strategy that incorporates “both food safety and food de-
fense for domestic and imported products”; and b) col-
laborative engagement “across the agency to address the 
three core elements of protection: prevention, inter- ven-
tion and response” [39]. It is in these collaborative en-
gagements that the government’s role as Mandator, Fa-
cilitator, Partner and Endorser in the specific area of food 
safety becomes evident—not only with the private sector 
but with all stakeholders. 
Admittedly, it can only be judged by the short time- 
frame of its existence. Still, an overview of the first six 
months of its activities is available. In terms of preven- 
tion, outreach activities are prominent and these approxi- 
mate the government as facilitator and partner models: 
“This outreach has involved multiple meetings with 
various foreign countries, state and local organizations, 
and industry and consumer groups… Specific risk-based 
prevention activities include FDA working in collabo- 
ration with states, universities and industry on a To- 
mato Safety Initiative. In an effort to increase foreign 
capacity and FDA’s presence beyond our borders, FDA 
has engaged with India and begun implementation of 
the China Memorandum of Agreement. The first bilat-
eral meeting with China was held in Beijing in March 
2008” [39].  
The second core element of protection, intervention, 
has seen an increase in the number of state inspections 
and employees to conduct them. Here is a case of gov- 
ernment as mandator. The legal regulatory element is 
evident but it is balanced by qualitative improvements in 
identifying “food safety threats at the border”; for exam- 
ple, the piloting of a new system called PREDICT. To 
coordinate developments such as these a research com- 
mittee has been tasked with maintaining a “collaborative 
research agenda that supports activities under prevention, 
intervention and response, such as mitigation strategies 
and rapid detection systems” [39]. 
The third pillar of protection is response. Herein lies 
the government as endorser role, for the key group identi-
fied for improved response is that of stakeholders. It is they 
who are deemed to “be able to quickly identify where a 
contaminated product came from and where it has been 
distributed”. Under development is so-called Incident 
Command System training and Rapid Response Teams 
“to enable rapid, localized response to incidents” [39].  
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3.2 The European Union: Codifier and  
Governance Coordinator 
Europe provides a ready laboratory for recent food scan- 
dals and governmental responses. In June 1999, it was 
found that egg, pork, veal, beef, milk, cheese and butter 
products in Belgium were contaminated with dioxin. The 
owners of the Belgian company, where the problem was 
first traced, were suspected of knowingly fabricating or 
buying from Dutch suppliers feed grain mixed with cheap, 
second-hand oil or fat that turned out to be con- tami-
nated with dioxin. The tainted feed was sold to 1,400 
producers in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Au- 
thorities of the European Union, based in Brussels, criti- 
cized the Belgian government for taking months to in- 
form the EU about the problem once discovered [40]. 
This case not only highlights the public-private sector 
relationship in CSR but levels of government-to-govern- 
ment communication and influence. Codex Alimentarius 
Commission as the highest international body on global 
food standards represents a higher governance level than 
government as mandator within the unitary state. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World 
Health Organization (WHO) Codex Alimentarius Com- 
mission met in Rome in mid-1999 to respond to the 
European crisis over dioxin-contaminated animal prod- 
ucts. The Commission set up an intergovernmental task 
force to accelerate the adoption of a Draft Code of Prac- 
tice on Good Animal Feeding. It also approved the estab- 
lishment of an intergovernmental task force to speed up 
the elaboration of guidelines and standards for foods de- 
rived from biotechnology; and passed new international 
guidelines that clearly defined the nature of organic food 
production to prevent misleading claims. The new guide- 
lines covered the production, processing, labeling, and 
marketing of organic food [41]. 
“Mad cow disease” was perhaps the most publicized of 
the European food scandals in recent time. It was related 
to the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and its 
human form, Creutzfeldt-Jakob (nvCJD) disease. The 
press release from the FAO on 26 January 2001 warned 
that the risk of BSE and its human form posed a risk 
worldwide and not only in Europe. The FAO also noted 
that all countries which imported cattle or meat and bone 
meal (MBM) from Western Europe, especially the UK, 
during and since 1980s, could be considered at risk from 
the disease [42]. 
The BSE and nvCJD issue once again showed that 
food scandals are closely associated with international 
trade and this is an area in which government as manda- 
tor has been less effective than the national level. In the 
aftermath of the issue, international actors such as FAO 
and WHO Codex Alimentarius engaged in a study on a 
“Code of Practice for Good Animal Feeding” to ensure 
that animal products do not pose health risks to consum- 
ers. Consultations were wide-ranging and included the 
European Union, Australia, Canada and the United States. 
This is a case suggestive of global governance as en-
dorser to influence national governments to become 
Mandators of CSR to the food industry, to assist in its 
task; the FAO introduced an internet based information 
service that included a rapid alert system on food safety 
issues [43]. 
3.2.1 White Paper on Food Safety 
In the aftermath of the BSE and dioxin food scandals, the 
EU published its “White Paper on Food Safety” (12 
January 2000). It should be noted that at the time when 
the EU faced alarming food scandals, the EU was the 
world’s largest producer of food and beverage products 
and this industry was the third largest industrial employer 
of the EU with over 2.6 million employees, of which 
30% were in small and medium enterprises [44]. 
The white paper proposed a “radical new approach” 
for food safety in Europe. Like the recent US Food Pro- 
tection Plan, food safety policy would be comprehensive 
and integrated in its conception. To this end, an inde- 
pendent European food authority was proposed.  
3.2.2 Formation of a Food Safety Authority 
The Commission stated that an independent European 
food authority would be entrusted with “scientific advice 
on all aspects relating to food safety, operation of rapid 
alert systems, communication and dialogue with con- 
sumers on food safety and health issues as well as net- 
working with national agencies and scientific bodies” and 
it would serve an analytical function but only the Euro-
pean Commission would decide on what action to take. 
The food authority’s fundamental principles would be 
independence, excellence and transparency [44]. A wide 
range of other legislative measures were proposed cover-
ing all aspects of food products from “farm to ta- ble”. 
The legislation was aimed to be easily under- standable 
for all operators to put into effect. It gave “teeth” to an 
otherwise weak government as endorser function. The 
EU as a supranational government is showing the way 
forward in terms of governmental in- fluence combining 
Mandator with Endorser. 
Like the American example above, stakeholder values 
were upheld by the white paper’s proposed actions to 
keep consumers well informed about newly emerging 
food safety concerns and to involve them in food safety 
policy. The white paper also had implications for trade 
partners of the EU which, in its position as a massive 
importer and exporter of food products, must play an 
“active role” in international bodies and be effective in 
explaining the European position on food safety [44]. 
The outcomes of the action plan were the integration of 
food safety policies within the EU countries and—to an 
extent—the EU’s trade partners, as well as a more coor-
dinated system. Transparency at all levels of food safety 
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policy stands out as a key principle. Relating to BSE leg-
islation, the white paper identified the problem of incon-
sistency in approach. In addition, the adoption of meas-
ures did not involve all EU institutions. In order to ad-
dress the integration needs within the single market of the 
EU, a new approach was proposed for farming, food 
processing, handling and distribution.  
As a result of the proposals, the European Food Safety 
Authority (see website EFSA, 2008a [45]) was set up 
based on Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, on 28 January 2002, as an 
independent source of scientific advice and communica- 
tion on risks associated with the food chain [46]. 
The lessons from the EU on government strategies for 
CSR in the food safety arena are that a combination of 
the top and bottom tier (legal Mandator and ethical En- 
dorser) works best. The ethical (independence from gov- 
ernment, transparency, and stakeholder consultation 
which are norms that are being entrenched) is in fact 
subsumed within the legal legislative framework throu- 
gh the EU’s unique governance structure. This is a more 
codified, yet governance (not government)-based sys- 
tem which sets it apart from nation-states like the US. 
The EU, however, shares with the US and the bi-na- 
tional case study below (Australia and New Zealand) the 
philosophy of a comprehensive and coordinated ap- 
proach. This pertains to a systems approach where the 
whole system is examined and activated, rather than se-
lective problem-solving. 
3.3 Australia and New Zealand: One System,  
Two Countries 
Integration and collaboration as twin themes of interna-
tional best practice in food safety are also evident in the 
antipodes. Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
(FSANZ) is a bi-national government regulatory agency 
whose mission, according to its website is “to provide a 
safe food supply and have well-informed consumers”. Its 
main responsibility is to develop and administer the Aus- 
tralia New Zealand Food Standards Code which is given 
legal force through these two countries’ food legislation. 
FSANZ as well as other government agencies “monitor 
the food supply to ensure that it is safe, and that foods 
comply with standards for microbiological contaminants, 
pesticide residue limits and chemical contamination” [47]. 
At the time of the Chinese “tainted milk” scandal, 
FSANZ’s website provided updates on Chinese imported 
food, including products withdrawn, product testing, 
consumer advice and maximum melamine levels in food. 
In a coordinated effort with other national and state food 
safety agencies, FSANZ engaged in the following actions 
[47]: working with importers and local food manufactur- 
ers to ascertain if products with Chinese dairy ingredients 
are possibly contaminated with melamine; conducting 
precautionary testing of products on Australian shelves; 
monitoring of imports by the Australian Quarantine and 
Inspection Service; and working closely with food regu- 
lators around the world including the WHO. 
The above is indicative of how the Australasian sys- 
tem responds to a food contamination problem when it 
involves imports. China turned to the WHO for help in its 
“tainted milk” crisis and more rigorous regulations on 
food safety were being introduced [48].  
The final section of this article draws lessons for China 
from the foregoing two sections on CSR theory and em-
pirical case studies. 
4. Lessons for China 
4.1 Background to China’s “Tainted Milk”  
Scandal 
The “tainted milk” scandal broke out in China in Septem- 
ber 2008. The Sanlu brand of powdered milk formula 
was found to be tainted by the industrial chemical mela- 
mine, a binding agent used for plastics and glue but 
added to watered-down milk as it mimics protein. The 
contamination resulted in the deaths of at least four ba- 
bies and some 54,000 infants needing medical treatment 
that month. The main symptom was kidney stones, for 
which 3,458 infants were hospitalized in Beijing alone; 
indeed, a survey of 308,000 households in Beijing indi- 
cated that a quarter had fed their children the contami- 
nated milk prior to it being removed from the shelves [49]. 
Melamine was found not only in Sanlu baby for- mula 
but a total of 53 dairy brands in China, as well as foreign 
brands using Chinese dairy ingredients [50]. This was not 
the first food safety incident emanating from China. A 
range of goods exported from China, including toothpaste 
and pet food, have been found to contain melamine and 
other industrial chemicals. 
Premier Wen Jiabao responded to the scandal by say- 
ing China had to strengthen monitoring at the production 
level, as well as instilling a stronger sense of social con- 
science and business ethics at the management level [51]. 
So, too, Chinese President Hu Jintao said lessons must be 
learned from the milk scandal to “ensure all dairy prod- 
ucts sold to the market are qualified products” [52]. By 
late October 2008, a draft food safety law was being con-
sidered by the National People’s Congress. The law 
would seek to a) “prevent any cover-ups by health au- 
thorities”—which was said to have occurred in the Sanlu 
case in order to avoid a scandal during the Beijing Olym-
pics—and b) would confer on these same govern- ment 
health officials direct responsibility for approval of any 
additives in processed food [49]. Thus the authorities 
would be held responsible for what goes into processed 
food as well as for attempts to disguise the outcome. 
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4.2 Lessons 
Besides a lack of proper governmental oversight and in-
adequate procedural mechanisms in quality testing, the 
“tainted milk” scandal (like other unsafe products in the 
past) showed the presence of corrupt business practices 
that bypassed China’s quality controls. As noted by de-
Gategno [53]: “China has not succeeded in building ef-
fective systems for monitoring and enforcing ethical 
standards among its officials. The central government has 
and is continuing to implement reforms that make offi-
cials increasingly accountable, but they have little control 
if no one reports corrupt acts.” It is local officials, ac-
cording to deGategno, who are key players in food safety 
and who need to abide by the rules. Here is a case of 
government needing to instill ethical CSR at the level of 
businesses and local officials. The strategy to do so re-
quires not only an EU-style government as both Manda-
tor and Endorser, but also more work on the government 
as Facilitator and Partner. 
The corruption factor has an international dimension. 
Ironically, a company from New Zealand—an exemplary 
country in terms of food standards regulation and busi-
ness ethics-was involved in the scandal. Owner of 43% of 
the Chinese company at the centre of the scandal, Sanlu, 
was New Zealand dairy co-operative Fonterra. It tran-
spired that Fonterra had known of the melamine con-
tamination six weeks before it “raised the alarm” (Sanlu 
allegedly had known for eight months) [54,55]. 
The involvement of Fonterra illustrates the global na- 
ture of food manufacturing and the wider governance 
responsibility this entails. The EU provides a quality 
model for the international dimension of how to codify, 
facilitate, communicate and develop a normative envi- 
ronment for food safety in cooperation with other gov- 
ernments and stakeholders. China’s own white paper on 
food safety, published in August 2007, reflects a num- 
ber of these lessons [56], even if they were to no avail for 
the victims of the “tainted milk” scandal within a year of 
its publication. Such was the impact of this scandal that 
the UN published its own report on food safety in China 
in October 2008. China needed to modernize its food 
safety legislation, overcome ambiguities in supervisory 
responsibilities; improve oversight and enforcement; bet-
ter educate stakeholders—consumers, the food Indus- try 
and health authorities; and continue to pursue interna- 
tional standards of best practice. One of the problems in 
China was that there were too many small enterprises, 
many illegal, to monitor. It is these that are thought re- 
sponsible for introducing illegal chemicals, with me- 
lamine having “apparently ended up in dairy products 
after middle men who collected milk from farmers and 
sold it to large dairy companies added the chemical” [57]. 
Approximately 350,000 of China’s 450,000 registered 
businesses in food production and processing employ as 
few as 10 people or less. The UN report blamed these 
small enterprises for presenting “many of the greatest 
food safety challenges” (ibid.).  
Despite the importance of government regulation in the 
government as mandator strategy, as discussed in this 
article, on its own it is inadequate and requires the other 
three types of CSR to combine for greater effectiveness. 
The Chinese system was found to be antiquated in that it 
was managed by different regulations and an ethos of 
government being expected to be responsible for the entire 
food system, whereas producers also needed to be 
responsible for food safety [58]. To induce greater res- 
ponsibility on the part of food producers, the activation of 
government as facilitator, partner and endorser repre- 
sents a more comprehensive strategy. 
For China, the experiences of others allow it the ad- 
vantage of being able to leapfrog in the construction of its 
own food safety system, so that the “workshop of the 
world” can simultaneously lift standards and glean the 
best practices the world has to offer on a comparative 
basis. That China is traveling this path is evident from the 
decision to publish its own white paper on food safety in 
2007 to allay fears about the safety of China’s exports, 
and other reforms that were underway after the “tainted 
milk” scandal in 2008. Already China’s Food and Drug 
Administration has been placed under the Min- istry of 
Health rather than having the responsibility di- vided 
among 16 organizations. Moreover, some compa- 
nies—Sanlu included—which were previously allowed to 
conduct their own quality inspections are no longer per-
mitted to do so [50]. An attempt to change the gov- ern-
ment culture of hiding problems to one of reporting them 
promptly is underway through legal measures but also 
needs to be strengthened through consumer protect- tion 
mechanisms and an enhanced corporate social re- sponsi-
bility. 
5. Conclusions 
Our study demonstrates that food safety has to be bound 
with CSR and the government has a critical role to play 
by developing comprehensive strategies to make cor- 
porations in food industry behave in a socially responsi-
ble way. A number of contributions emerged from our 
exploratory study. First, we have extended the CSR lit-
erature to the food industry and emerging economies like 
China. Second, we have identified the distinctive role the 
government plays in the food industry and that govern- 
ment influence on CSR in the food industry is deter- 
mined by the intensity and salience of its own behavior 
and actions. Third, we have provided a timely guide to 
establishing a food safety system in China based on em- 
pirical evidence that a balanced CSR strategy covering at 
least economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic consid- 
erations would work best for China. 
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